The Rationale of Zawahiri Statements
To many, the statements of al-Zawahiri and other radical Islamists on elections and jihad can be interpreted as the rantings of mad mullahs who hate freedom and the West.
But a careful reading of Islamist texts, provided by such authors as Andrew Bostom and Mary Habek (Knowing the Enemy) show that these reponses are entirely rational within the jihadi world view. This theology and ideology were developed centuries before Israel came into being and long before Western liberal democracies gained currency in the world.
The rationale, taken from Wahhab, Qutb, al Banna and others is simple: Only the Quran, as interpreted by these groups, can guide the world, providing a religious, political and legal handbook that cannot be abridged. Anything that is contrary to these interpretations of Allah’s law-including the statements in the Quran itself that speak less harshly of Jews and Christians, deemed to have been made under specific historic conditions no longer applicable-are punishable by death.
What could democracy offer, even in Arab states or Palestine? Nothing, because it is not divinely ordained. In fact, in jihadi literature, few things receive more scorn than the ideal of democracy, viewed as the imposition of human will over that of Allah. The other thing scorned is the charging of interest on money that is lent, hence the Muslim Brotherhood’s long-standing and expensive efforts to set up a completely different, Islamist banking system that is divinely sanctioned.
What can be gained from powersharing in Somalia between Islamists and a moderate, secular government? Absolutely nothing. There is no room for compromise or negotiation except to gain a temporary advantage that leads to Islamist triumph.
What, then, to be gained from negotiating with the Mullahs in Iran? Again, nothing. They are divinely sanctioned to lie, mislead, obfuscate and do whatever necessary to achieve their goal-the implementation of their interpretation of divine law (different from the Sunni version, but just as absolutist.)
These principles of divine rule and sharia are not negotiable to Islamists. They are a matter of life and death, heaven and hell, rational in their own terms. Liberal democracies like to look for ways to find common ground and negotiate solutions. That formula has served well for several centuries. But it is, in the context of Islamists, and irrational response to what, to them, are rational actions.
There is nothing to negotiate with Islamists. They want what they believe will bring them eternal salvation. Unfortunately, that means our destruction. There is really little to talk about.
commenting closed for this article
Somalia and Long Range Threat Assessments The War in Somalia Expands as Islamists Promised
Perhaps Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler will get busy and shows these guys “the errors in Islamist extremist thinking”.
However, I’m not encouraged by this approach. Since when does anyone show faith based-dogmatists the errors in their thinking? Like negotiation, “There is really little to talk about.”
— MelM Dec 20, 17:34 #
I do not, unfortunately, know enough to be intelligent on the topic.
— Douglas Farah Dec 21, 09:43 #
Well, Turkmenistan is a Muslim country, neighbour of Afghanistan. The president held all the power firmly. Will Taliban and/or AQ try to infiltrate and take control of the country ? Could it became a new battlefield in GWOT ?
We will see, I guess.
DG
— Drazen Gemic, Croatia Dec 21, 10:49 #
It is interesting to me that the Al Qaeda message appears to have changed from the protection of Holy Sites in 1990s to geopolitical analysis and provocation in the 2000s. Zawahiri’s message is clearly meant to provoke and all I see, in response, is overreaction by counterterrorism experts i.e. now, all Islamists are unapproachable in terms of a ‘negotiated balance’, if you will, between the secular and the Islamic religious sects.
If there is not a balance of discussion then we might as well start WWWIII. I mean – why not nuke Beirut with all those Hizbollah gathered in one place?
There is no doubt that Hamas, Hizbollah and Al Qaeda have made gains in politicizing their agenda. We all know the agenda and propaganda base – they use the excuse of a return to Caliphate rule with Sharia Law. Frankly, this unoriginal chant has become really boring.
The effort, I think. should be to send them back to where they belong i.e. in the minority. Mahmoud Abbas’ effort for a new election is meant to raise issues that could help achieve this re: Hamas. From what I understand, Malilki is trying to form a coalition which would function to send Al Sadr back into the minority.
I am for training Iraqi troops for both the protection of key personnal (those Muslims who advocate nonviolent means) and to help Iraqis keep the peace. I am for use of special forces to take out folks like Zawahiri. And, unlike President Bush, I think we need to modernise pragmatic peace i.e. a global peacebuilding intiative and see if we can’t get someone in the Muslim world to listen.
I do not expect the result of these efforts to be democracy but what I can hope for is balance between the secular and the religious sects and that use nonviolent means to resolve their differences will prevail.
— Philip Henika Dec 21, 15:11 #
What is bringing down the moral theologans faster than any protest here in the US is the publication of sexually and financially wayward pastors. The gasp factor re: Haggard et al is now only a small yawn and a snide derision.
Has there been any concerted attempt to scrutinize and publicize the mullahs?
— vachon Dec 21, 17:37 #
Good article, Douglas. You have made several good points with history to support your facts. Now what?
What we really need, I do believe, the world is not ready to accept.
— Rosemary Dec 21, 18:32 #
“There is nothing to negotiate with Islamists. They want what they believe will bring them eternal salvation. Unfortunately, that means our destruction. There is really little to talk about.”
I have no quarrel with this statement as it is applied to hard-core Islamists.
But that doesn’t mean there isn’t much to talk about with the governments (and populations) of Muslim countries – even those currently dominated or heavily influenced by the Islamists. Long-term, this is a battle for the hearts and minds of that broader population of Muslims and their leaders, who are not yet thoroughly in the hard-core Islamist camp. I see no prospect that purely military and law-enforcement means will eradicate that hard core – rather we must seek to gradually and continuously marginalize them.
— Jan Rooth Dec 22, 11:30 #
I agree with Jan Rooth.
Recently, Bruce Hoffman provided this assessment of the war on terrorism:
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/41f0508e-ccc5-46b5-a2c7-c89930bfbef6.html
World: Analyst Assesses The Global War On Terror
Bruce Hoffman
(RFE/RL)
WASHINGTON, December 22, 2006 (RFE/RL)—The global
war on terror is now being fought by governments in
many countries and on multiple continents, from North America to Asia, Europe to Africa. RFE/RL
correspondent Heather Maher spoke with Bruce Hoffman,
an expert on terrorism at Washington’s Georgetown
University and the author of “Inside Terrorism,” about
the successes and failures of the war on terror.
RFE/RL: Since U.S. President George W. Bush first
uttered the phrase “war on terror” in 2001, the
terrorism situation around the world has changed
dramatically. The war now represents a global effort,
fought by many different governments against both
homegrown and foreign groups. Is the label still
appropriate?
Bruce Hoffman: The war on terrorism, as [Bush] defined
it, was really a war on all terrorist groups with
global reach, not just Al-Qaeda. Today, the war on
terrorism has become something of an anachronistic
term. It’s very difficult for this administration to
move away from it because the president portrays
himself as a war president.
My concern, though, is that the concept of the war on
terror has outlived its usefulness, in two respects.
Firstly, it was never the war on terrorism, which I
always thought was a mistake from the start because we
know what terrorism is. The “ism” defines terrorism
ineluctably as violence that is designed to achieve
political change, whereas a war on terror is basically
a war on an emotion, on anything that scares us, or
anything that threatens us. I think that’s a very
different thing.
That led, I think, to a conflation of [weapons of mass
destruction] with terrorism, which was not terribly
helpful. But I also think [the war on terrorism label
is] an anachronism because what we’ve come to
understand is that even though we needed to rely on
military force during the initial years in the war on
terrorism, now triumphing against this menace will
depend as much on political initiatives, economic
reform, and information programs—in other words,
soft power as opposed to hard power. But when you say
“war,” war ineluctably means using military force, and
I think the struggle is really about much more than
the application of military force.
RFE/RL: This question is often asked: Is the West
winning or losing the war on terror? U.S. officials
and their allies say, “yes,” while other governments
clearly say, “no.” What do you say?
Hoffman: I think in a tactical sense we’re winning.
Al-Qaeda is certainly weaker than it was in 2001. It’s
certainly less capable of these massive, spectacular
attacks, such as convulsed not just Washington and New York City on 9/11, but the world.
I think strategically—as successful as we’ve been
tactically—strategically we’ve suffered a number of
setbacks. That National Intelligence Estimate that the
United States intelligence community released in
September described an increase in radicalization
worldwide and an enmity toward the United States
around the globe, which suggests what we’re doing may
be very effective tactically—in killing and
capturing terrorists. But it’s not having a positive
effect in changing the environment that promotes or
that gives rise to terrorism. And I think that’s an
important part of the equation that has to assume even
greater salience and importance today.
RFE/RL: Did the U.S. invasion of Iraq help or hurt the
fight against terrorism?
Hoffman: When one looks at polling data and global
attitudes, it seems evident that it’s hurt more than
it’s helped. It’s inflamed an important segment of the
world—the Muslim population—whom we need to
really counter what is a threat to themselves, a
threat to the values that I think transcend religious
or national boundaries. I mean values of freedom,
democracy, and mutual tolerance, of pluralism, of
environments where we can all live our lives in a
manner we wish and not feel that we have to conform to
someone’s stereotype or someone’s dictate.
So certainly there’s enormous commonality, but I think
that Iraq has emerged as an enormous irritant if not a
fulminate. Rather than contributing to the importance
of this cooperation, it’s served as a force that has
alienated and polarized some of our most important
allies, in Europe as well as in the Middle East, South
Asia, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.
RFE/RL: If, and when, the United States withdraws its
troops from Iraq, is there a danger that the war will
be remembered for years to come as a reason for
Islamic terrorists to continue fighting the United States and its allies?
Hoffman: Provided the United States can counteract the
ill effects of Iraq and can still achieve some of the
fundamental goals that animated the United States when
it became much more involved in the Middle East in
2003, in a way, after several years of neglecting it.
If we can bring, first and foremost, peace and
stability to that part of the world, then in turn
security, then in turn justice, and then achieve some
of our other goals, I think Iraq will be remembered as
an unfortunate blip on the radar.
Israeli forces moving into the Gaza Strip in July
(epa)But if we’re unsuccessful in the general scheme,
if we withdraw from the Middle East, if we turn our
back on what we began to do, I think Iraq will be
remembered even potentially as the beginning of the
end of U.S. influence and power and stature.
RFE/RL: Five years after it sparked the war on terror
with its attacks on the United States, what does
Al-Qaeda look like now?
Hoffman: I think it’s changed fundamentally. On 9/11,
Al-Qaeda was a state within a state in Afghanistan and
had a network of operational bases, training camps,
command-and-control headquarters. It had worldwide
operations, according to the U.S. Department of State,
in some 64 countries, one-third of the countries
throughout the world, and seemed to function without
too much interference and operated with impunity.
Obviously, that’s all different now. Al-Qaeda has no
one single geographical base that it can call a
sanctuary or a safe haven or a home. It has been
harried and harassed throughout the world. Bush
frequently says three-quarters of Al-Qaeda’s top
leadership has been either killed or captured.
Throughout the world, other countries have arrested up
to 4,000 Al-Qaeda operatives. So there’s no mistake
that it’s a weaker organization than it was on 9/11.
But that’s still different from saying that Al-Qaeda
has disappeared or gone away completely.
I believe that Al-Qaeda continues to exist, that the
problems that we see are not only those of
radicalization. The problem is one of continued
subversion by Al-Qaeda. The radicalization occurs
because Al-Qaeda is actively working to radicalize
people. And I would argue, too, that Al-Qaeda still
retains some command-and-control capacity where it can
plan, plot, direct, and guide terrorist operations
throughout the world.
RFE/RL: Who are its main leaders?
Hoffman: Certainly [Osama] bin Laden and Ayman
al-Zawahiri. There’s a conventional wisdom that says
they’re cut off, that they’re not in command. How do
we know this? I mean, I think that could be as much
wishful thinking—there’s no empirical evidence. We
see this particular year, Al-Sahab [the Al-Sahab
Foundation for Islamic Media Publication, the media
production house of Al-Qaeda, which issues the group’s
propaganda]—Al-Qaeda’s perennially active media arm—has produced and distributed a record number of
statements from bin Laden. But more from Ayman
al-Zawahiri. So clearly they’re able to record these
types of messages.
As much as we may have Al-Qaeda on the run, it seems
that their media arm doesn’t seem terribly harried or
harassed. So in that sense I think the core leadership
remains the same. I think that they have a deeper
bench and that they’ve had a process of corporate
succession where people have come up through the ranks
to assume positions of command.
Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the new leader of Al-Qaeda in
Iraq, is an example. He’s an Egyptian, not an Iraqi.
There’s a generation of Al-Qaeda activists we don’t
know about but who have risen through the ranks to
replace those in key tactical or command or
operational positions who we have killed or captured.
RFE/RL: In the last couple of years, it seems that
Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have increasingly
used the Internet to get their messages out and to
broadcast images and video – especially of hostages—aimed at intimidating people and governments in the
West. Is the Internet helping sustain and grow the
terrorism movement?
Hoffman: Absolutely. I mean, this is why there are
more than 5,000 terrorist and insurgent Internet
sites. They’ve increased exponentially in the past
five or six years alone. I think we do very little to
counter that. Most of our information operations are
still oriented towards traditional means of
communication—television, radio, or the newspapers.
A young man in Pakistan shows a cell phone with a
likeness of Osama bin Laden (epa file photo)Now that
is important, because of course it reaches the elites,
it reaches a certain demographic. But throughout
exactly the most contested areas of the world, from
North Africa across the Middle East to South Asia,
there’s an enormous demographic shift happening with
this huge youth bulge. And we know that youth tend not
to get their information or news from the same sources
that their elders have gotten them from.
And if they’re getting their information more from the
Internet, it means we have to communicate just as
effectively over the Internet. We have to contest this
virtual battle space in much the same manner as we are
very successfully doing in other traditional forms.
RFE/RL: What is the situation in Central Asia, where
many Islamic groups have been banned by governments
for suspected terrorist activities?
Hoffman: In Central Asia, these groups have gotten
traction because they can claim persuasively that they
are fighting against what they see as authoritarian,
anti-Islamic, corrupt regimes and that they offer an
alternative. I think, though, that the geographic
isolation of Central Asia means that the violence that
has often been endemic to that part of the world since
the breakup of the Soviet Union generally remains
confined to that area, with few exceptions.
But, of course, unrest in Central Asia radiates to
Russia, radiates southwards to Afghanistan, to
Pakistan, to other parts of the world, and affects
Iran, as well. So one can’t quite so blithely say that
the unrest and instability there can be contained.
Groups there seem to have bought less into bin Laden’s
global jihadist ideology [than have groups in some
other parts of the world]. To some extent, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, for example, has [adopted the
global jihadist ideology]. But at the same time, other
groups have pretty much remained regionally or very
parochially focused.
RFE/RL: What does the terrorist threat look like in
Russia?
Hoffman: The main terrorist threat to Russia is really
because of the Chechen problem, more than even
Al-Qaeda. And it’s a problem that may have become more
sporadic, but it’s certainly become much more lethal
and much more desperate.
Just the seizure in Beslan in September of [2004] was,
I think, the watershed in terrorism, at least in that
region. I think for every country, the most important
strategy cannot only be to kill and capture, but it
has to be to break the cycle of recruitment and
regeneration, to counter the terrorists’ message that
sustains these movements over generations.
And I think that’s one problem that the Russians face.
As effective as they might have been tactically, in
the application of military force or state security
force against terrorists, they have not yet come to a
point where they’ve broken the cycle where this will
not continue to be a repetitive, regenerative problem.
RFE/RL: The Taliban has made a strong comeback in
Afghanistan. Are we losing the war on terrorism in
that country, which is the first place the United States intervened after 9/11?
Hoffman: Well, certainly, there’s been an enormous
backsliding in Afghanistan. Not only a spike in
insurgent activity, but suicide terrorist attacks,
which were unheard of in Afghanistan, are now
multiplying with a singularly disturbing frequency.
I think Afghanistan is demonstrating, just as Iraq
has, that it’s not enough to have forces there that do
the clearing. They also have to do the holding, which
means you have to have sufficient forces that can
provide security and stability for the population so
they’re not preyed upon by the insurgents, so that
they feel confidant in the government’s ability to
discharge the fundamental expectations that citizens
throughout the world have of their governments—that’s to protect them and defend them, to provide
security so they can get on with their lives, so that
they can engage in daily commerce, so that they can
socialize.
That I see as one of the biggest threats, and why our
adversaries think they will eventually triumph,
because they feel that they can eventually wear us
down, or that we can’t protect every target all the
time, or they believe they have the impunity to strike
anywhere, at any time.
RFE/RL: Syria and Iran are considered state sponsors
of terrorism by Washington. What is the situation in
those two countries?
Hoffman: The policies and the activities of Syria and
Iran have really amounted to some of the biggest
setbacks in the war on terrorism we’ve seen in the
past year, because there was a time immediately after
9/11 when tens of thousands of people turned out in
the streets of Tehran to express their solidarity with
the American people.
There was a time when Syria was an enormously helpful
and cooperative ally in the war on terrorism in the
Middle East. And we’ve seen in the past year our
relations with both those countries deteriorate
dramatically and significantly. And we’ve seen them
revert to behavior that really is not entirely
dissimilar to the complaints we were making about both
countries 20 years ago, over [their influence in]
Lebanon, as well. I mean, over the same issue. In that
sense, we’ve regressed, which is very worrisome.
In part, this may be a reflection of the U.S.
inability to engage both countries in recent years,
and that estrangement has led to a greater
polarization and hardening of attitudes towards the
United States, which is why I think it’s important
that we do have discussions with all the major powers
in the region and not unilaterally exclude them.
By the same token, we should not have unrealistic
hopes or expectations that overnight, months, if not
years, of neglected enmity and hostility can easily be
reversed.
RFE/RL: Are U.S. diplomatic efforts in the war on
terror equal to its military efforts?
Hoffman: No, no. Look, during the Cold War, we used to
have the United States Information Agency, whose
mission was public diplomacy and information
operations. Now that’s just an office within the State
Department, and that’s a reflection of
under-resourcing, and also a neglect of what I think
is an important component in the war on terrorism.
I think, though, in recent years the State Department
recognizes this and has tried to do more and has
overhauled its communications, has overhauled its
public diplomacy. But the difficulty now is that it’s
playing catch-up.
RFE/RL: One of the consequences of the war on terror
has been a rollback of certain freedoms and civil
liberties – for example, the right to privacy. That is
because many governments feel there is now a need to
give police and security organizations greater powers,
for example, to collect information. How concerned do
you feel citizens should be over this?
Hoffman: This is the main challenge that we face—that the terrorists seem to be very innovative in
discerning new ways to attack targets, even hardened
targets, and we seem to be much less creative and
adept at devising defenses.
New airport security measures were introduced in the
United States following a terrorist threat in August
(epa)I worry because it’s very easy to impose security
measures. It’s far more difficult to ever remove them
or modify them. What terrorists feel so threatened by,
and what they try to threaten, is our freedom and our
movement, and our ability to be uncontrolled. And we
always have to be careful about imposing measures that
play into the terrorists’ hands in some respects, and
result in the kind of rigid, heavily policed societies
that are inconsonant with freedom and democracy and
the liberal values that we cherish.
RFE/RL: What are the terrorists trying to achieve—if indeed one can say that the major groups are
unified in their goals? When will they stop thinking
of the West as an enemy that must be defeated?
Hoffman: They believe in the historical inevitability
of their cause. They believe time is on their side and
that they gradually, through a strategy of attrition,
will exhaust us, undermine our morale, and debilitate
us to the extent that [for example] the United States
will withdraw from world affairs and become
isolationist and stop interfering in what they see as
their own affairs, or stop propping up what they see
as corrupt governments.
They believe that the entire international order is a
Western states’ creation and therefore, [they] want to
break down how we’ve organized international relations
for at least 400 or 500 years—the nation-state
system—and return to a golden era of Islam, for
example, where there was transnational or
supernational Islamic rule under a caliph, under a
religious figure that knew no geographical boundaries
and was just one big geographic community.
So it’s, on the one hand, more practical things like
paring down United States power [and] providing a
credible alternative to the Western state system, but
also more grandiose schemes, to do away with
government and geographical boundaries completely.
— Philip Henika Dec 22, 11:53 #