Fire and Ice
A reporter follows some of the money that led to Sept. 11.
Reviewed by Shaun Waterman
Sunday, May 30, 2004; Page BW07
BLOOD FROM STONES
The Secret Financial Network of Terror
by Douglas Farah - Broadway. 225 pp. $24.95
One of the first new laws the Bush administration promulgated following the Sept.
11 terror attacks was an executive order that made it easier to freeze the bank
accounts of suspected terrorists and their supporters. By Nov. 7, more than $20
million had been seized in accounts allegedly linked to al Qaeda or its backers,
and by March of this year, that figure had grown tenfold.
But if Washington Post reporter Douglas Farah's gripping new book is to be
believed, the administration was shutting the stable door after the horse had
already gone. In essence, Farah's tale is a simple one, told in spare,
newspaperman's English. In the fall of 1998, shortly after al Qaeda had bombed two
U.S. embassies in East Africa, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, a senior associate of Osama
bin Laden, had arrived in Monrovia, the capital of the tiny West African state of
Liberia, and the seat of its kleptocratic gang boss of a president, Charles Taylor.
Earlier that year, a Nigerian-led regional security force had finally expelled
Taylor's allies from their capital, Freetown. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
of neighboring Sierra Leone, whose fighters were fellow graduates of Col. Moammar
Gaddafi's revolutionary training camps in the Libyan desert were driven out
handily. But the RUF maintained control over the country's huge, easily exploited
diamond deposits in the east. From there the stones were smuggled across the border
into Liberia -- where, in exchange for huge commissions paid to Taylor and his
cronies, the RUF could sell them to dealers for export and resale in Antwerp,
Belgium, the world's largest gem market. The RUF used the cash for arms to continue
its bloody and protracted struggle for power in Sierra Leone.
For a terrorist or other criminal, the advantages of diamonds are legion. They are
small and easy to hide or move around, and they are practically as convertible as
cash. "It is a point of honor among diamond buyers," Farah writes, "to ask no
questions about the provenance of the stones they buy." Abdullah did not buy any
diamonds on that first visit, but by the summer of the following year, the Clinton
administration -- spurred by the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania -- had
begun to tighten the financial net around al Qaeda's conventional funds. So al
Qaeda created a pipeline through which the group could move millions, perhaps tens
of millions, of dollars from the banking sector into the shadow world of gem and
gold smuggling and informal money transfer, or hawala.
The man who made this all possible is a Senegalese mercenary -- he says he is a
used car dealer -- named Ibrahim Bah. While Farah's just-the-facts stylistic
discipline is generally welcome, Bah -- who knew Taylor and his RUF buddies from
Libyan training camps, spent the 1980s in Afghanistan and the Lebanon, and turned
down a million-dollar proposal from the CIA -- is rendered but thinly in the pages
of Blood From Stones. If it is a virtue to leave the reader wanting more, then
Farah is virtuous to a fault when it comes to Bah; he's a character who cries out
for anecdote and adjective.
As the Sept. 11 hijackers were finalizing their preparations in the summer of 2001,
Abdullah and two other senior al Qaeda operatives were set up in a safe house
rented by Bah in Monrovia. The pace of their purchasing became so frenzied that the
RUF's other customers were complaining about being frozen out.
It would be almost impossible to know how much of their money the leaders of al
Qaeda salted away in this fashion before the 19 hijackers struck, even if the
operation had been under surveillance. But -- one is tempted to add "of course" --
it was not.
For anyone who has followed the various inquiries into Sept. 11, the intelligence
and law enforcement failures that preceded the attacks have become an easily
recalled and deeply depressing litany. But Farah gives us a whole new raft of
missed leads, bungled opportunities and bypassed chances to have disrupted al
Qaeda's diamond trade. As he says, this would by no means have stopped the attacks,
"but it would have left the nation less unprepared for the war it now faces."
Even today, after NGO investigators and war crimes prosecutors have substantiated
Farah's reporting, the U.S. government prefers not to acknowledge it. As recently
as March, a State Department official told a congressional panel on the war against
terror in Africa that he was not aware of any evidence of an al Qaeda presence in
the region. As Farah observes, "rhetoric in the war on terror has masked a lack of
sustained interest in fighting the threat on the ground" -- much as has been the
case with the long-running federal war on drugs. Late last year, a small team of
financial specialists from the FBI's counter-terrorism division visited South
Africa and Sierra Leone to research the diamond trade and its terror links. Their
mission grew out of congressional interest that was sparked by Farah's reporting.
In the immortal words of law enforcement officers everywhere, the investigation is
continuing. There's no word on what they've found, but at least they're looking.
Shaun Waterman is the homeland and national security editor for United Press
International.
Copyright © 2004 The Washington Post Company
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