Paul Pillar, former deputy CIA counter-terrorism chief, has an interesting op-ed in today's Washington Post posing an important question regarding the Afghanistan conflict:

Whether preventing a safe haven in Afghanistan would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.

Clearly Pillar is arguing that the answer is Afghanistan is not worth the price, given those terms of debate. One of his main points is that The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.

Here is where I disagree. Clearly training camps are not of paramount importance to terrorist groups, and the Internet provides a fluid and almost risk free way to communicate both ideologically and personally, and physical safe havens are not as vital to many aspects of the terrorist threat as they were before 9/11. But it misses a key point to dismiss their importance to the degree Pillar does.

Almost all the personal ties and connections that were formed among those who have carried out different terrorist attacks took place because the actors had a place where they meet each other, understand they were not alone in their vision of jihad, and build relationships of trust.

This is fundamental to any cadre, and something that virtual exchanges simply cannot replace. The meetings in the hotel rooms and apartments were possible because of the bond of trust forged in a broader common experience.

People are seldom motivated to act based on the Internet alone. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Ramsey Yousef, the 1998 Embassy bombers, Bali bombers and the current group of foreign recruits in Somalia all share a tie that could never be forged outside of being in a battlefield and fighting the infidel.

Those who undergo the same experiences (training, combat, deprivation, communal living etc.), even if they do not do it together, share a bond that cyberspace simply cannot bridge. It is the building of community that is vital in moving someone from interest in jihad to actual involvement.

It is also worth remembering the cross-training and learning experiences that safe havens provide. Hezbollah and al Qaeda exchanged "lessons learned" and technology when bin Laden was in Sudan.

Sudan itself was the great mixing bowl for all radical Islamist groups, under the guidance of al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing Hamas and Hezbollah, PIJ and al Qaeda a safe meeting ground that enhanced the operational capacities of each and forged the bonds that still are relevant today.

I think the analysis also overlooks the importance, in jihadist theology, of a physical caliphate or space that is considered a true Muslim nation or divine kingdom on earth. Hence the fight in Somalia, Afghanistan etc. It is not so much about conquering space to create safe havens as it is to establish the rule of Allah on earth, and eventually, spreading that rule over the entire earth.

Safe havens make jihadists stronger. The cost of denying them is high, and Pillar is right that the case has not yet been publicly made for that in Afghanistan. It is time to seriously consider whether it can be made.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has added another $2.2 billion to his shopping spree of Russian weapons, buying 92 new tanks and sophisticated anti-aircraft systems.

Chávez's buying spree (he is up to some $6 billion in the past three years) has helped fuel a destructive arms race in the region. While Colombia has spent more, and received more from the United States, it is fighting not only a narco-Marxist insurgency (the FARC) but a host of other armed criminal drug trafficking, narco-paramilitary gangs that threaten the state.

No other country is facing anything similar, yet as Andres Oppenheimer notes in the Miami Herald,the region is now engaged in an arms race that is wasting precious resources as the continent gets poorer.

What is particularly interesting about Chávez's purchases is that they focus on anti-aircraft capabilities, the very thing the FARC has asked Venezuela to provide, and a capability the rebels are desperately seeking. As multiple reports show, (and the Reyes computer documents clearly outline) the FARC has grown desperate for surface-to-air capacity because the military helicopters have been so lethally effective in the government's counter-insurgency campaigns.

A few downed helicopters would force the Colombians to radically rethink and redesign their strategy. One of the FARC documents, a letter from Raul Reyes to Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega (before Ortega was president) asks for $100 million, to be obtained from Libya, in order to purchase the weapons. The recent sting operation in Honduras against a retired Syrian military officer was centered on the acquiring of the weapons.

Chávez, in his seemingly firm belief that the primary threat to his existence is a U.S.-led aerial assault on Venezuela, seems to be doing all he can to insure that he protects himself.

Unfortunately, again as the Reyes documents show, he views the FARC as part of his rear-guard, able to help him wage an asymmetrical campaign against the invader when the fighting comes.

That means, but his logic, backed by his actions, that arming anyone, even terrorist organizations for which he has a strong affinity, is the best defense. That he is spending his nation into a serious hole in pursuit of that goal is a dangerous thing indeed.

In its latest bid to avoid international banking sanctions, Iran has reached an agreement with the Central Bank of Ecuador to allow the Export Development Bank of Iran to operate in this Andean nation.

The move came even though Ecuador is fully aware that EDBI is under U.S. Treasury Department sanction for illicitly providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

According to the Treasury Department's designation statement:

"In response to international sanctions and the refusal of many responsible banks to do business with Iranian banks, Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran, to handle its illicit transactions." said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. "Today's action exposes EDBI's role in helping Iran violate UN sanctions so that financial institutions around the world can take appropriate steps to protect themselves."

Established in 1991, the EDBI is an Iranian state-owned financial institution whose primary purpose is to serve Iran's import and export communities. In addition, the EDBI operates as the Iranian representative for the Islamic Development Bank, a multinational institution that cultivates economic and social improvements in member nations, in accordance with Islamic law.

However, the EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran's WMD programs. Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities.

At the same it designated EDBI, Treasury also designated the "Venezuelan" Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID), a wholly-owned Iranian bank that was constituted in 2007.

Its founding documents show the BID (not to be confused with the multi-national lending agency, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, also known as BID) is wholly owned (all 40,000 shares) by Bank Saderat, an Iranian bank under U.S. and UN sanction. The BID (Venezuela) was also granted an operating license, along with EDBI, in Ecuador.

According to the U.S. Treasury designation:

Bank Saderat has been a significant facilitator of Hizballah’s financial activities and has served as a conduit between the Government of Iran and Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

District Attorney in Manhattan, Robert Morgenthau, in a speech yesterday at the Brookings Institution warned that the proliferation of Iranian banks through Venezuelan auspices was a danger to the region.

"Generally speaking, nobody is focused sufficiently on the threat of the Iran-Venezuela connection," said Morgenthau, whose New York jurisdiction includes the offices of numerous U.S. financial institutions.

Venezuela is not under U.S. or international economic sanctions. That means U.S. banks processing wire transfers from Venezuelan banks rely on their Venezuelan counterparts to ensure the exchanges are for legitimate purposes, Morgenthau said.

"I have little faith that this is being effectively done, and the Iranians, aware of this vulnerability, appear to be taking advantage of it," he said.

Now, with an Ecuadoran branch set to open, the vulnerabilities have grown and diversified.

The DEA and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York have unveiled a new indictment for drug trafficking that shows just how truly transnational and intertwined with terrorists, aircraft merchants, and little-scrutinized company registries these groups have become.

The case centers on Jesus Eduardo Valencia-Arbelaez, aka "Padre," aka "Pat," who was extradited from Romania to stand trial for drug trafficking and money laundering. I think these two paragraphs sums up the huge challenges faced with these organizations that have now grown tentacles around the world. Plotting this on a map would help give the true dimensions of the enterprise.

Valencia-Arbelaez was a leader of a sophisticated international cocaine trafficking organization (the Organization) based in Colombia and Venezuela that operated worldwide, including in Bolivia, Spain, Holland, Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry, Mauritania, Mali, Cyprus, and the United States.

Beginning in September 2007, members of the Organization sought to purchase a cargo airplane for the purpose of transporting metric tons of cocaine from Venezuela to West Africa. Between September 2007 and March 2009, Manuel Silva-Jaramillo, a member of the Organization arrested earlier this year, conducted meetings in connection with the Organization's efforts to acquire the airplane in, among other places, Madrid, New York and Virginia. Silva-Jaramillo arranged to finance the purchase of the airplane through a corporation based in Cyprus and to register it in Sierra Leone.

It would be incorrect to assume the Organization has an organic structure in each of the countries named. Rather, it has carved out important links to existing criminal organizations there, and have key operatives in the country or region to keep an eye on the operations and collect or pay money, as necessary.

But it does show a remarkable integration across four continents and the ability to manage multiple moving pieces. It also shows how mobile the Organization's key personnel are. Valencia-Arbelaez was arrested in Romania, where he had gone to further discuss the purchase of aircraft for his organization. Unfortunately, Viktor Bout, denied bail yesterday by a Thai judge, was unavailable for business.

This case follows closely on another one where the DEA, using the tried and true uncover tactic of pretending to be buying weapons for the FARC in Colombia, captured a former Syrian military officer in Honduras, purporting to have weapons obtained from Hezbollah to sell on the international market.

Jamal Yousef, aka "Talal Hassan Ghantou," an international arms trafficker, was charged with participating in a narco-terrorism conspiracy. What is interesting about the case is that it was to be a transcontinental weapons for cocaine trade. While such trades are reported anecdotally, there has been little first-hand evidence of this type of activity among designated terrorist organizations.

So, we have a Syrian in Honduras offering to sell Hezbollah weapons stashed in Mexico, reportedly stolen from Iraq. Again, the geographic space in the operation is significant and, until fairly recently, an insurmountable obstacle.

The silver lining in this is that the arrests were made. It is a part of the shifting tactics of the DEA and others to target the "shadow facilitators" like Yousef who have access to different criminal and terrorist networks and broker the deals that are profitable to all.

But the scary part is just how far-flung and inter-active these groups have become. Globalization and market forces at their best.

It is clear that the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan (only now seriously beginning as a counterinsurgency effort) is in serious difficulty. As the New York Times reports, there is little actual support from the central government's police or military forces outside of Kabul.

Support for the war is dropping at home and among key allies, particularly Britain. The most optimistic assessment that the commanding general there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, can come up with is that the situation is serious but salvageable. Hardly the rose colored glasses.

But the underlying problem, as McChrystal and others know, is not the military, but the complete and utter incompetence of the Karzi regime, to which we are so tightly wedded.

The corrosive corruption and unwillingness/inability/blindness of the Karzi is what will be the ultimate demise of that war. A foreign fighting force cannot win unless a host government, viewed as legitimate by its people, is fighting the war as well. That is not the case in Afghanistan.

History should not be forgotten. What propelled the Taliban to power in 1996 was the public disgust with the corruption and state violence of that time. Transportation was impossible because of the multiple road blocks. Constant bribes made it impossible to rebuild the country or attract anything like foreign investment. Warlords fighting over poppy revenues and ethnic interests left the country a wreck.

The Taliban's appeal then, as now, is rooted in the promise of restoring order and eliminating corruption. It is a sad measure of how bad things are currently that the fact that the Taliban utterly failed at this the first time around is often ignored or that their reign of religious terror is viewed as preferable to the current situation.

The public knowledge that his close family members are among the largest heroin traffickers in the country make any pretense of eradication or a successful "kingpin" strategy (knocking off the top traffickers to break up large criminal organizations) a bad joke.

I am not an Afghanistan expert but have covered and studied numerous insurgencies and counter insurgencies over more than two decades and that is the one lesson I take away as a universal.

The unfettered power of local, regional and national officials to make people pay for basic services, the administration of "justice," or any other basic transaction, is the most destructive force that gives insurgents the oxygen they need to thrive.

The impunity granted officials who steal, rape and pillage their own population will undercut any "clear and hold" strategy because the people do not want the government to come in behind. And the government, if it does come in behind, comes to loot and pillage.

This is the fundamental dynamic that more troops, no matter how well they fight and what sacrifices they make, cannot address. It is the result, in part, of the neglect of Afghanistan during the previous administration, coupled with the general unwillingness of NATO troops to view the situation as a war. The exploding poppy trade has made all the worst elements, from the Taliban to Karzi-allied warlords, rich enough to finance their conflict for years to come.

All this adds up to the fact that changing tactics on the ground for U.S. troops fighting in hostile conditions, or even a major strategic initiative to win hearts and minds, will ultimately fail. Only the Afghan people and their frightfully short-sighted and greedy leadership, can make the changes necessary. If you can make the Taliban look good, you are not really fit to govern.