A Chilling Look at the Taliban's Success
In a fascinating find Newsweek has published a nine-page “book of rules” that the Taliban is distributing in its areas of control in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The list itself is not earth-shattering, a list of principles to guide its militants on everything from what infidels can be executed to moving from one unit to another.
But what is shows is that the Taliban leadership has the time and space to fashion such a handbook, something a group cannot do when it is seriously pressed militarily or living primarily on the run.
It also clearly demonstrates a coherent command and control structure, with orders coming down, written permission being needed for specific actions (merging units etc.) and a vertical structure that can impose punishment as well as reward. The duties and sole responsibilities of senior commanders, junior commanders and the supreme commander (Mullah Omar) are laid out quite clearly.
It also shows that they may have learned over the years that keeping the population on their side, with measures other than straight coercion, is necessary in to long-term survival. Taking boys without beards to the battlefield, taking weapons and goods from civilians and mistreatment of civilians are all explicitly banned.
It is not a benevolent list, however. How and whom to execute, how to handle kidnap victims and other detainees dominate. It is a matter of who can make the decision to impose Taliban justice-usually death-rather than the form the justice takes, that is outlined.
Of interest is the desire to end education by infidels across the board, both in madrassas and regular school. The fact that teaching to read, write or think is such a threat in an interesting statement on its own. Teachers can be warned before being killed, but if they teach “against the Qoran” they can be executed.
The list shows that the movement has enough penetration in areas outside its direct control to need to give guidence to commanders.
While Iraq has been worse than most people imagined, Afghanistan is the place that baffles me. How it was possible to allow the Taliban to snatch some sort of victory from the jaws of defeat, is really beyond me. That unfinished business will haunt us for many years.
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This little handbook is nothing much: could have been done by a journalist. But your 2 prior pieces are FABULOUS. Keep up your great work. JK
— john kirby Dec 15, 13:49 #
I have read that Taliban are able to operate the company sized units in many articles this year. It is not a news. I guess that some kind of command structure is needed to achieve that.
Is it a success ? Maybe. They are still getting killed in even greater numbers than before. Company sized units make better targets.
It is obvious that the local government has failed their mission, just like it has in Iraq. It sounds like racism, but some countries are simply not able to organize themselves. Creating a nation out of number of tribes and clans is a historical process that took a long one. Some nations were not able to complete it. It usualy took a charismatic leader to accomplish that.
The question is where to find a leader theese days .
DG
— Drazen Gemic, Croatia Dec 16, 06:42 #
What keeps puzzling me are the phrases “regional commander” and “district commander”. Military is not organized that way. There are unit commanders, and territorial HQ is organized at very high command level only.
So, it looks more like some kind of civilan authority, or mixed civilian and military structure. It seems that the unit commanders are subordinate to territorial commaners.
I think that it is a good news, because that could mean that there is no Taliban central military command and coordination for the whole territory of Afghanistan.
DG
— Drazen Gemic, Croatia Dec 16, 07:03 #
An alternate view is that this pamphlet seems to demonstrate a real concern by Mullah Omar over misconduct by fighters, territorial commanders making local deals, exchange of prisoners for money, infiltration by spies etc. Of course this could simply be Mullah Omar attempting to prempt these activities but is more likely to be in response to a real decline in discipline or why would he take the time to write it at this stage (no smoke without fire).
Not only is he dealing with the fiercely independent nature of the Pashtun tribes that are inclined to reject central control in favour of local affiliations but also established cultural mores among Pashtun fighters such as taking the company of young boys, smoking cigarettes (which to paraphrase the words of Pres Musharraf are as likely to be laced with Hashish as anything else!!) and engaging in old fashioned banditry (it is well known secret in Pakistan that most smuggling activity has a link to the frontier tribes).
Struggling to maintain cohesion over fiercely independent tribal militia in the frontier provinces is not a problem that Mullah Omar alone has experienced over the years! He is attempting to do so at a time when his command and control is being disrupted, previous allies are less reliable than in the past (Pakistan is at least not openly supporting the Taliban as in the 90’s) and there is the possibility that locals may receive generous benefits from the international community that was never really was hope when the Taliban came to the power in the 90’s.
This interpretation of his manual/ disciplinary ultimatum also adds some weight to the statements of various tribal leaders who have complained to NATO forces/ BBC media about needing security in their districts from the Taleban/ Mujahid. Under the Taleban administration poor security was not a usual complaint of Pashtun tribal leaders!! In fact there legitimacy sprang from providing order at a time of anarchy (post Soviet withdrawal). Poor discipline is often an indication of weakening capability and this may present a real opportunity to counter insurgency operators in Afghanistan.
— CB Dec 18, 07:28 #
CB:
I think that is a useful reminder of the problems faced by the Taliban and others, and certainly a valid point on what the manual means for Mullah Omar et al. But it does also show that they have time, energy and resources to deal with these problems in a more formal, systematized way that would not be possible if they did not have some breathing space.
— Douglas Farah Dec 18, 09:39 #