A Serious Problem with The Surge
The Bush administration has finally turned its attention in a serious way to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. It has, of course, been seriously deteriorating for some time and the attention is likely to be brief.
Afghanistan has been the victim of international attention deficit disorder. Not only the Bush administration suffers this malady that could snatch dfeat from victory.
What has changed in the past 18 months? The Taliban have new weapons, vehicles, communications equipment with encryption, and outreach and propaganda facilities.
Seriously rethinking how to try to retake the initiative is long overdue. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have gone from a defeated, dejected force under fire even from fellow travelers, to resilient heroes in the past two years.
Given the lack of security, people are helping the Taliban, if not for conviction, then out of fear that, ultimately, the Taliban will return, as they have in several provinces already.
The massive focus on Iraq by the Bush administration would have been less damaging to Afghanistan if NATO and other allies had been more willing to pick up the slack.
Unlike the Iraq invasion, where Bush stood virtually alone and the U.S. set the strategy, Afghanistan was a widely supported effort. There was recognition in Europe and NATO that the persistence of the Taliban state and al Qaeda haven were not just a threat to the United States but to the broader Western world.
The consequences of the years of complacency and blind assumptions are now clear. Coming up on six years after occupation of Afghanistan, more opium than ever before in its history is being grown. My sources recently returned from there say the Taliban (the role of al Qaeda is far less clear) are financing their resurgence, including premium payments for new armed recruits, from the opium and heroin trade. The central government controls little more than Kabul. Warlords have increased in power.
Senior Afghani officials talk of the billions in wasted aid, the massive duplication of efforts, the creation of parallel bureaucracies outside of state control, that led much of the international reconstruction project still-born.
Many NATO nations (with the notable exception of the Dutch, Canadians and Brits) have caveats on what their forces can do, when they can engage and what the operational bounderies are. It is a terrible thing to go to war. It is even worse if you are in a war and your senior civilian authorities are unwilling to admit that fact.
Because of Iraq, including the surge now underway, the U.S. has no ability to put more troops into the Afghanistan theater. NATO will likely do little to alter the current situation. The Taliban continues to recruit, arm and train.
Afghanistan’s window of opportunity may already be closed. The circumstances that led to the chance for true change, and the undercutting of the appeal of the Taliban, are radically changed. More money and a few minutes of attention will not recreate the tipping point that seems to have tilted decidedly toward chaos and away from victory.
commenting closed for this article
Is Iran Reaching Too Far in Iraq? Africa: Different Paths to Success and Failure
The Canadians and Brits also do not have caveats and in fact have engaged in much more combat than the Dutch and taken many more casualties.
For the Canadians see:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703#athena
And check out the URL above for “The Torch”, a group blog on the Canadian military.
Mark
Ottawa
— Mark Collins Jan 25, 16:28 #
Unfortunatly this seems to be a persistent ailment of Afganistan. Is it just me, or do we not learn (or care to learn) from the last time the same thing happened?
— Rafael Jan 25, 19:33 #
I read a story just yesterday about a Taliban announcement that they were going to start building and running schools in the areas they control. I’d say that if they can build and run schools, they’ve won.
John Burns was on Charlie Rose last night for the hour. I always watch when he’s on; I think he’s a perceptive observer and has been covering Iraq for years. Anyway, Charlie asked him a question about what al Queda is thinking. Unfortunately, Charlie cut him off with another question before he had completed his answer. John was about to get to a critical point (I hoped) when he was cut off. What I was interested in was whether or not al Queda is convinced that we won’t shift to all-out war against Islamic totalitarianism. If they are sure that we won’t fight, then we’re going to be hurt badly. In fact, that’s what I now expect. There is not one leader (that I know of) in Washington (admin, House, Senate, etc) that is willing to do what’s necessary to protect this country. They don’t know (or are evading) who the enemy is or where they’re located.
http://www.charlierose.com/
(This video will be available for a couple of days.)
— MelM Jan 25, 19:33 #
This is how the U.S. is trying to win. From the Brick Testament:
http://www.thebricktestament.com/the_teachings_of_jesus/on_love/lk06_35.html
— MelM Jan 25, 20:43 #
“Not only the Bush administration suffers this malady that could snatch victory from defeat.”
I believe you meant to say “snatch defeat from victory”, if I understand you correctly.
Unfortunately, we have another situation where “victory” was claimed with no thought for the long-term strategic situation. It was predictable that Taliban and al-Qaeda forces would fall back under pressure from the US invasion, and that they woulds return to fight another day.
As long as they have safe haven in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, and as long as we allow them to train, recruit, re-supply and launch attacks from that region, we are doomed to fight the same battle each year.
This worked against the Soviets (with our support), and there is no reason for al-Qaeda to assume it will not work a second time.
— Robert Belgrad Jan 26, 08:21 #
Douglas, you said “The Taliban have new weapons, vehicles, communications equipment with encryption, and outreach and propaganda facilities”
Is this aid still coming from Pakistan primarily? Where is the new equipment coming from?
— Ray Robison Jan 26, 15:12 #
Yes, largely from Pakistan. I have, and should have mentioned in the blog, had several extensive conversations with people who work Afghanistan-Pakistan for different types of tasking. The assessment is almost unanimous-this is several years too late, we are repeating the same mistakes we have already repeated numerous times in Afghanistan on the aid front, and the attention paid will be too short to make it work. Pakistan has institutional aid to the Taliban by too many ISI people for it to be completely rogue operations.
— Douglas Farah Jan 26, 18:32 #
From the article:
————————————
Another senior official involved with Afghanistan policy, offering a private briefing recently, said allied troops are facing a “bloody year in the south” in fighting the Taliban and slow progress in tackling the problems in the country, including corruption, opium production, and lack of roads and other infrastructure. “We still can succeed,” he said, but “it is going to be a long project.”
————————————-
This situation is getting downright delusional. There’s not going to be any progress and EVERYBODY KNOWS IT BUT EVADES IT. The Dems are pushing us into the same kind of mess as in Iraq. The “Forward Stategy of Freedom” expected to create a kinder Islam that would want “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” and the Bill Of Rights. What a joke!
The U.S. gov hasn’t a clue about what they’re doing and I think it’s past time to stop killing our soldiers for nothing. IF WE ARE FIGHTING FOR OUR SURVIVAL, THERE’S NO WAY THAT WE SHOULD BE LEAVING A PESTHOLE CRAP COUNTRY LIKE PAKISTAN TO HARBOR AND SUPPORT THE TALIBAN. Sending kids to their deaths for a war WE’RE NOT EVEN SERIOUS ABOUT is morally evil.
The Iraq war, the Afghan war, and peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are all based on the same wrong premises and won’t work. Leave these places and leave the aid money and soccer balls at home! Only fighting the power centers of Islamic totalitarianism will work. Where are those? Gol-LY, gee whiz; what a puzzle, what a puzzle.When and if we figure out what to do, then and only then should the soldiers be sent out to fight again.
— MelM Jan 26, 20:43 #
Two problems that occurred that weren’t discussed were that not only was focus and funding taken from Afghanistan with the Iraq whimsy, but up to 30,000 of the troops that were reassigned were special forces, rangers, and others who had training and experience in Afghanistan and would be best suited to blocking off infiltration (to the extent that is possible).
The other problem is one that got the Taliban in in the first place-
rampant corruption by the civil administration. Combine these with the problems stopping cross border resupply that we faced in Vietnam with the Ho Chi Minh Trailin this case Waziristan and an excruciatingly mountainous areaand the task is, unfortunately, likely to be unsalvageable if we try to keep a presence in Iraq at the same time (in fact this is why the former British Chief of the Army suggested Britain withdraw troops from Iraq-he viewed Iraq as lost, Afghanistan as salvageable but only if energies were focussed there.— Peter Munsing Jan 28, 14:39 #
I have heard a lot of talk about “emboldening the enemy” and, once again, I find a deficiency in our counterterrorism measure.
Islamic militants are emboldened i.e. motivated by a variety of factors. The simple presence of US troops in Iraq is one factor that emboldens the enemy. The fact these US troops are in proximity to the Holy Sites of Mecca and Medina emboldens i.e. motivates the enemy. The Battle of Badr fought around ~600 A.D. emboldens i.e. motivates the enemy because they believe that Allah will intervene when the odds are stacked against them and that they are chosen ones in contrast to the kaffir or the unbelievers. Islamic militants are also emboldened i.e. motivated by propaganda spread on the Internet.
Our leaders, on both sides of the aisle – Republican and Democrat -rarely give us an accurate assessment of the motivation side of the counterterrorism equation. Rarely is reference made to what MOTIVATES THEM or what can be done to direct Muslim youth, for example, away from recruitment into a future of terrorism.
— Philip Henika Jan 28, 14:57 #